A Critique of Nietzsche's _On the Genealogy of Morals_

The German philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche wrote in On the Genealogy of Morals (1887):

“They who are from the outset botched, oppressed, broken, those are they, the weakest are they, who most undermine the life beneath the feet of man, who instill the most dangerous venom and skepticism into our trust in life, in man, in ourselves. . . . On such a soil of self-contempt, a veritable swamp soil, grows that weed, that poisonous growth, and all so tiny, so hidden, so ignoble, so sugary. Here teem the worms of revenge and vindictiveness”

Nietzsche goes on (and on) in the second of three essays in the book about the pitfalls of asceticism, which is, generally, a lifestyle based in abstention from earthly pleasures, such as sex and alcohol, especially for religious reasons. He argues adherents are largely driven by resentment because they are, among other things, weak and, thus, attempt to make such a shortcoming into a virtue, into submission, say, or meekness. He calls this subversion of the good the slave morality. The ascetic priests, the worst of the bunch, according to Nietzsche, divert this blame, the resentment, inwards unto the self; think of the Christian concept of original sin, for instance.

While some of Woke ideology maps onto Nietzsche’s overall description of the slave morality well, since, for example, it often acts to shame those in positions of power as inherently corrupt or evil, the most salient and problematic examples of actualized revenge and vindictiveness today derive from the powerful. Simply look around: police brutality in the US, military aggression around the world, government oppression and censorship in countries such as Iran, Russia, and China; all that is needed is a certain level of dissent.

Further, the ascetics have foregrounded key concepts that are still valid and under-appreciated today: moderation, non-materialism, humility, self-control, skepticism, forgiveness, mercy, etc. (After all, “asceticism” comes from the Greek for “training” or “exercise.”) We need much in the way of training. It is just as easy to become egotistical or entitled as it is to become resentful.

To be clear, Nietzsche is not completely opposed to asceticism, when it is sincere; it gives suffering meaning, fostering a will. The goal is not to let it lead to a “will for Nothingness, a will opposed to life.” If Nietzsche had equally critiqued his Nihilistic antidote, the Will to Power, a philosophy of self-actualization of the will, a natural expression of power, the work would be, pun-intended, more powerful for it.